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FROM ZERO-SUM TO ECONOMIC PARTNERS:
REFRAMING STATE TAX POLICIES IN INDIAN
COUNTRY IN THE POST-COVID ECONOMY
Pippa Browde*

ABSTRACT
The disparate impact COVID-19 has had on Indian Country
reveals problems centuries in the making from the legacy of
colonialism. One of those problems is state encroachment in
Indian Country, including attempts to assert taxing authority
within Indian Country. The issue of the reaches of state taxing
authority in Indian Country has resulted in law that is both
uncertain and highly complex, chilling both outside investment
and economic development for tribes.
As the United States emerges from COVID-19, to focus only on the
toll exacted on tribes and their peoples ignores the tremendous
opportunities for states to right these historical wrongs. Buoyed by
federal COVID-relief funds, state and local governments are in a
financial position to reframe their tax policies to promote tribal
sovereignty and support economic development in Indian Country.
This article argues for states to make diplomatic, responsible state
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and local tax policies that will create healthier intergovernmental
relationships and an environment that in turn creates broader
economic growth for tribes and states alike. Through policies
requiring state governments to consult with tribes to make joint
decisions on tax policy and by refraining from exercising taxing
authority in Indian Country, states can move from a zero-sum
game. Instead of competing for precious tax revenue, state and
local governments can partner with tribes to expand the total
amount of available revenue streams. Doing so will not just right
the historical wrongs of colonialism—it could also help prevent
future crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, from having such
a disparate impact on tribes again.
I. INTRODUCTION
States have been attempting to assert jurisdiction in Indian Country since
the time of the nation’s founding, setting up the historical enmity between tribes and
states, often referred to as the “deadliest enemies.”1 Such encroachment by states has
only increased over time.2 This jurisdictional encroachment has been particularly
contentious in the area of taxation.3
1. The phrase describing the hostility between Tribal governments and the states as “deadliest
enemies,” is from United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
A note on terminology for readers unfamiliar with terms common in Indian law. The terms “Indian tribe,”
“tribe,” and “Indian nation” refer to “a group of Indians that is recognized as constituting a distinct and
historically continuous political entity for at least some governmental purposes.” WILLIAM C. CANBY JR.,
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 4 (5th ed. 2015).
“Indian country,” as defined by federal statute, “means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian
reservation . . . including right-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian
communities within the borders of the United States . . . and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to
which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.” 18 U.S.C. § 1151.
This definition is for purposes of criminal law, but it also applies to describe the land described in this
article.
There is no universal definition of who counts as “Native American Indian,” or “Indian.” FELIX
S. COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 171 (Nell Jessop Newton ed. 2012). For
purposes of this article, such terms describe a person or people of indigenous American ancestry who are
recognized by “the individual’s tribe or community.” Id. The term “non-member Indian” refers to Native
American Indians who are not members of a governing tribe. Id. at 712 & n.158, 731 & n.1. For purposes
of the doctrine involving state taxation in Indian Country, non-member Indians are treated as non-Indians
when engaged in transactions within the Tribal territories to which the non-member is not affiliated. Id.
at 731–33 (“Most courts treat Indians who are not members of the governing tribe the same as non-Indians
for the purposes of concurrent state taxing authority in Indian country. . . . There remain reasons to
criticize this approach.”).
The history of state attempts to assert power in Indian Country beginning with the cases referred
to as the “Marshall Trilogy” are explained in Part II.A, infra note 26 and accompanying text.
2. See Part II.A infra notes 35–40 and accompanying text for explanation on how termination-era
policies led to an expansion of state authority within Indian Country.
3. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Retiring the ‘Deadliest Enemies’ Model of Tribal-State Relations,
43 TULSA L. REV. 73, 78 (2007) (“Until recent years, tribal and state interest competed in a vigorous (and
often vicious) zero-sum game of civil regulation, taxation, and criminal jurisdiction.”). The problem has
been categorized as competition for revenue. See Russel Lawrence Barsh, Issues in Federal, State, and
Tribal Taxation of Reservation Wealth: A Survey and Economic Critique, 54 WASH. L. REV. 531, 533
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Supreme Court jurisprudence has gradually eroded a tribe’s ability to tax
within its geo-political territory while at the same time expanding the potential for
states and local governments to tax non-Indians engaged in business within Indian
Country.4 Questions of taxation in Indian Country are answered by law that is both
complex and highly uncertain. Uncertainty as to applicable tax law in Indian Country
has several negative collateral consequences as a practical matter.5 Outside investors
may be reluctant to do business deals in Indian Country if the tax consequences are
uncertain or overly burdensome.6 When a state has overlapping taxing authority (or
even the possibility of such authority), tribes must choose between imposing a tax
and attracting the investment. At the core, these problems impair a tribe’s ability to
raise revenue and self-govern, thereby reducing tribal sovereignty.7
Calls for reform in this area are not new. Tribes, scholars, and practitioners
have been advocating for the curtailing of state taxing authority in Indian Country to
alleviate the collateral consequences described above for years.8 There is renewed
urgency for tribal taxation as a tool to promote tribal sovereignty. Most visibly, the
COVID-19 pandemic laid bare the problems, both economic and otherwise, that arise
from centuries of abuse that federal and state governments have inflicted upon tribal
governments.9 Tribal business enterprises—many of which focus on tourism,
hospitality, and gaming—have been closed or restricted in operation throughout the
pandemic. This has resulted in “the almost total drying up of business revenuedependent tribal budgets.”10
In addition to the economic conditions created by the pandemic, there is a
global reckoning for racial and social justice for historically marginalized peoples.
For Native American Indians and Indian tribes, this requires reckoning with the
historical and continued injustices of colonialism, one of the two original sins of the
(1979) (noting the strain on state and local government budgets and impact of strain on competition for
tax revenue within tribal territories).
4. See Part II.B.1.a infra notes 55–59 and accompanying text (explaining law limiting tribal taxation
within territorial boundaries); Part II.B.2 infra notes 65–69 and accompanying text (explaining expansion
of reaches of state taxation within Indian Country).
5. See Part II.B.3 infra.
6. See id.
7. Matthew L. M. Fletcher, In Pursuit of Tribal Economic Development as a Substitute for
Reservation Tax Revenue, 80 N.D. L. REV. 759 (2004); Adam Crepelle, Taxes, Theft and Indian Tribes:
Seeking an Equitable Solution to State Taxation of Indian Country Commerce, 122 W. VA. L. REV. 999
(2020).
8. Fletcher, supra note 7, at 800–05; Mark J. Cowan, Double Taxation in Indian Country:
Unpacking the Problem and Analyzing the Role of the Federal Government in Protecting Tribal
Governmental Revenues, 2 PITT. TAX REV. 93 (2005); Scott A. Taylor, A Judicial Framework for
Applying Supreme Court Jurisprudence to the State Income Taxation of Indian Traders, 2007 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 841 (2007). Most recently, see Crepelle, supra note 7.
9. This necessarily implicates the federal government’s failure to meet its trust obligations with
respect to Indian tribes. For explanation on relevant history, see Part II.A infra note 43 and accompanying
text. For analysis of how the federal government failed to meet its obligation, see Part III infra notes 172–
176 and accompanying text. The COVID-19 Pandemic has also prompted Indian law scholars to call for
an expansion of tribal regulatory authority more generally than just taxation within Indian Country. See
Katherine Florey, Toward Tribal Regulatory Sovereignty in the Wake of the COVID-19 Pandemic, 63
ARIZ. L. REV. 399 (2021).
10. SAHIR DOSHI, ALLISON JORDAN, KATE KELLY & DANYELLE SOLOMON, THE COVID-19
RESPONSE IN INDIAN COUNTRY: A FEDERAL FAILURE 1 (2020).

4

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 52

United States. Such reckoning offers lessons on the value of sovereignty or power to
tribal governments.11 Professor Maggie Blackhawk provides a framework for
addressing the legacy of colonialism by promoting tribal sovereignty through the
distribution and limits of governmental powers among the federal, state, and tribal
sovereigns.12 She notes how federal judicial doctrine has not been an effective tool
for promoting sovereignty.13 Tribes have had more success through executive policymaking and Congressional action.14
How can tribes achieve the sovereignty they need to heal, sustain, and
grow? Tribal governments must be free from state encroachment, economic and
otherwise. Most of the literature has called for a federal preemptive solution, be it
legislative or judicial, to the problems of state encroachment in the field of taxation.15
A federal legislative preemption of state tax in Indian Country would be effective,
but it has not come to pass and it is politically unrealistic to expect it will anytime
soon.16 This article offers an alternative approach: it argues for states to make
diplomatic, responsible state and local tax policies that promote tribal sovereignty.17
Such tax policies will create healthier intergovernmental relationships and an
environment that, in turn, creates broader economic growth for tribes and states alike.
States can help promote tribal self-governance and sovereignty through
institutional policies that require meaningful, government-to-government
consultation. States can take a further step to correct problems of multi-jurisdictional
tax in Indian Country. In cases where a state may have overlapping jurisdiction over
transactions involving non-Indians, states may refrain from taxation.18 And in cases
in which a tribe lacks taxing authority over non-Indians transacting within Indian
Country, a state can impose a tax similar to tribal taxes to create a uniform taxing

11. Matthew L. M. Fletcher, Indian Lives Matter: Pandemics and Inherent Tribal Powers, 73 STAN.
L. REV. ONLINE 38 (2020) (arguing for tribal regulatory authority over non-Indians during a pandemic);
Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law as Paradigm within Public Law, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1793,
1800 (2019) (arguing that the history of colonialism and the “violent dispossession of Native lands,
resources, culture, and even children offers different, yet equally important, lessons about how to
distribute and limit government power.” She further argues that “[t]he word ‘slavery,’ like the word
‘colonialism,’ appears nowhere in the Constitution. Yet, like American other original sin, traces of
colonialism are woven in like threads to the fabric of the document.”).
12. Blackhawk, supra note 11, at 1797–99 (distinguishing from “rights-based” legal frameworks that
addressed legacies of slavery and Jim Crow policies from “power-based” legal frameworks that are
adequate to address the legacies of colonialism).
13. Blackhawk, supra note 11, at 1799 (“Throughout the twentieth century, it has often been
Congress and the Executive – and the ability to access the lawmaking process through petitioning and
lobbying – rather than the courts, that have provided sanctuary [for tribes].”).
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Cowan, supra note 8 (positing federal solutions including congressional action, federal
tax incentives, or other incentives to resolve double tax problem). Professor Cowan catalogues a number
of scholarly articles addressing federal proposals. Cowan, supra note 8, at 97 n. 26. See also Taylor, supra
note 8 (arguing for a “logical and unified” preemption approach by Congress to state income tax on Indian
traders).
16. See generally Blackhawk, supra note 11, at 1793.
17. This is not the first article to argue for collaborative relationship building between states and
tribes. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Retiring the ‘Deadliest Enemies’ Model of Tribal-State Relations, 43
TULSA L. REV. 73 (2007).
18. See Part II.B.2 infra for the law and types of cases in which this conflict arises.
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regime.19 Moving from a zero-sum game in which states force tribes to compete for
precious tax revenue towards a strategy of states and tribes becoming economic
partners to expand the total amount of available revenue streams could help prevent
future crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, from having such a disparate impact
on tribes again.
This article proceeds as follows: Part II explains the historical context and
overview of jurisdictional issues regarding state and tribal taxation in Indian Country
and the impact those rules have on economic development in Indian Country. Part II
also provides data on the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic in Indian Country and
connects the current reckoning for racial justice in the United States to the calls for
meaningful tribal sovereignty. Part III contains an analysis of how states and local
governments can help support tribal sovereignty, why doing so will promote
economic growth in Indian Country and the broader region, and how choosing to
promote tribal sovereignty can help repair the recent devastation caused by COVID19 and heal the wounds of historical enmity. Part IV concludes.
II. BACKGROUND
This part provides background on the history of federal Indian law and
policy relevant to the jurisdictional dispute between tribes and states over taxing
authority in Indian Country. It then explains the jurisprudence and doctrines of taxing
authorities in Indian Country as between states (and local governments) and tribes.
It also provides data on the COVID-19 pandemic and the disparate impact the
pandemic has had on tribes and Native American Indian populations, both in terms
of health and economic outcomes. The disparate impact borne by tribes reflects the
history and legacy of colonialist policies. Finally, this part looks at the impact of the
COVID-19 pandemic in Indian Country and tribal desire for meaningful sovereignty
in the context of calling for reconciliation of the history and legacy of colonialism.
A.

Historical background of law and policy in Indian Country is the
foundation for state encroachment on tribal sovereignty.

The disparate health and economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic in
Indian Country are nothing new.20 Rather, the consequences of the pandemic felt by
tribes and their peoples are the result of over 400 years of oppressive policies
imposed on tribes.21 Until recent decades, these policies reflected only federal
priorities and amounted to dynamic vacillations of the federal government’s
interpretation of the obligation to protect “tribes and their properties, including

19. See Part II.B.1.a. infra notes 55–59 and accompanying text for more on this particular type of
problem.
20. See Fletcher, supra note 11, at 38 (“American Indian people know all too well the impact of
pandemics on human populations, having barely survived smallpox outbreaks and other diseases
transmitted during the generations of early contact between themselves and Europeans.”).
21. It is impossible to provide 400 years’ worth of history on the relationship between tribes and the
federal government in an article of this size. See CANBY, supra note 1, at 13–34, for a succinct but
excellent overview of the history of the specific policies of the federal government regarding Native
American Indian tribes.
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protection from encroachments by the states and their citizens.”22 Because the
current situation in Indian Country reflects the historical events that led to this point,
it is important to understand those events.
From time immemorial, Indian tribes existed as full sovereigns.23 Early in
the United States’ history, recognizing that tribes were governments with
sovereignty, the federal government negotiated treaties with tribes.24 At first, the
federal government exercised its plenary power with respect to transactions with
Indian tribes, prohibiting states from doing so.25 The United States Supreme Court
denounced state efforts to impose its laws within tribal nations.26
Any initial respect given to tribes as sovereign governments by the federal
government did not last long. European settlers sought more land and more natural
resources and conflict for ownership of land.27 The Indian Removal Act resulted in
forced migrations by numerous tribes from the eastern United States.28 By the late
1800s, Congress stopped making treaties with tribes and instead used its unilateral
power by legislating matters of Indian affairs. In 1887, Congress passed the General
Allotment Act, known as the Dawes Act, which broke up Indian reservation land and
allotted acreage to individual Indians to own in fee simple.29 In doing so, Congress
hoped to assimilate Indians by making them individual landowners, enforcing
European agrarian methods, and granting American citizenship.30 The effect of the
Dawes Act was to diminish tribal sovereignty, erase reservation or Indian territory
boundaries, and force assimilation.31 In allotting land to individual Indians, the
22. See Id. at 2.
23. Id. at 73 (“At the time of the European discovery of America, the tribes were sovereign by nature
and necessity; they conducted their own affairs and depended upon no outside source of power to
legitimize their acts of government.”).
24. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 19–29. However, the existence of treaties did not mean that the terms
have been respected, nor does it mean the treaty-making process itself was free from corruption or abusive
practices. See id. 24–25 n.6-11 and accompanying text.
25. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting power of Congress to regulate commerce with Indian
Tribes); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the President power to make treaties with tribes subject to consent
of the Senate). These affirmative grants of federal powers effectively removed from the states any power
to do what had been granted to the federal government. See CANBY, supra note 1, at 14.
26. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 520 (1832) (“The whole intercourse between the United
States and this [the Cherokee] nation is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the
United States.”) The United States Supreme Court’s early precedent in three cases authored by Chief
Justice John Marshall in what are referred to as the “Marshall Trilogy,” became the “foundation of
jurisdictional law excluding the states from power of Indian affairs, and it has much vitality today even
though it is not applied to the full extent of its logic.” CANBY, supra note 1, at 19. The three cases are
Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823); Cherokee v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831); and Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
27. For the historical events leading up to the Indian Removal Act, see COHEN supra note 1, at 41–
50.
28. Indian Removal Act, Pub. L. No. 21–148, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830).
29. General Allotment Act of 1887, Pub. L. No. 49–105, ch. 119, §1, 24 Stat, 388, 388, repealed by
Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106–461 §§ 101–103, 114 Stat. 1991
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 2201-2219 (2020)).
30. General Allotment Act at § 6.
31. Cnty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 254
(1992). For a full explanation of the history of the General Allotment Act, see Cohen supra note 1, at 72–
75 n.5–15 and accompanying text.
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federal government effectively opened up reservations to ownership by non-Indian
settlors.32 As a result, non-Indian settlors acquired more than ninety million acres of
land that had been guaranteed to tribes through treaties or other agreements.33 These
allotments of land held in fee that transferred to ownership by non-Indians today
create a “checkerboard” of land ownership on reservations.34
This loss of land triggered increasingly serious poverty among Indians that
the federal government could not ignore.35 Congress reversed the policies advanced
by the Dawes Act— allotment of Indian land and attempts to terminate tribal
nations—with the Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”).36 The IRA was meant to
restore tribal land to tribes and develop tribal economies.37 Although the IRA was
effective, the federal policies in favor of self-governance were short lived. By the
end of World War II, the pendulum had swung again to federal policies against tribes
and for termination of tribes. During this era, known as termination, Congress
withdrew the federal government’s strong presence and allowed states to expand
their civil and criminal jurisdiction within Indian Country.38 The effects of
termination were severely damaging to tribes both economically and culturally,
weakening tribal sovereignty.39 “Termination” meant the end of federal programs
that offered services to tribes and their members, including health, educational and
welfare services, and amounted to widespread loss of land by tribes.40
In the 1970s, the federal government renewed policies favoring selfdetermination and self-governance.41 Congress passed a series of laws intended to
expand tribal self-determination and self-governance and to revitalize and protect
tribal cultural and spiritual practices.42 The policy favoring self-determination
continues to this day.

32. CANBY, supra note 1, at 23–24.
33. Id.
34. Under Section 5 of the General Allotment Act, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §
348), non-Indians purchased or homesteaded “surplus” Indian lands. This land that passed out of tribal or
individual ownership no longer was considered to be Indian Country. See Seymour v. Superintendent, 368
U.S. 351 (1962).
35. LEWIS MERIAM, INSTITUTE FOR GOVERNMENT RESEARCH, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN
ADMINISTRATION 3 (1928).
36. Indian Reorganization (Wheeler-Howard) Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5121).
37. Id.
38. For extensive background on the history of the Termination Era, see COHEN, supra note 1, at
§1.06 notes 1–33 and accompanying text. A major piece of legislation that was enacted during the
Termination Era was the so called “Public Law 280.” 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1231–26, 28 U.S.C. §1360). Public Law 280 expanded state civil and
criminal jurisdiction in five states, and provided that other states could assume similar jurisdiction by
statute or state constitutional amendment without consent of affected tribes. See CANBY, supra note 1, at
29.
39. COHEN, supra note 1, at §1.06.
40. Id.
41. Id. at §1.07 notes 1–98 and accompanying text.
42. The two major legislative acts were the passage of the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93–638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §450
et seq.) and the Tribal Self-Governance Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–413, tit. III, 108 Stat. 4270 (1994)
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 450a note, § 458aa et seq.).
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Throughout the historical fluctuations in federal Indian policy, the federal
government has had an obligation, referred to more broadly as the trust relationship,
with Indian tribes. The trust relationship is generally based on the notion that when
tribes relinquished their ancestral land to the federal government, the federal
government had an obligation to respect tribal nations’ unique political sovereign
status and also provide for their welfare.43
An analogy to Indian law and policy is that “[h]istory has set [the] stage,
but it is not the play.”44 The history described above contextualizes both the conflicts
of taxing authority between states and tribes, the fallout from the COVID-19
pandemic in Indian Country, and the current moment in which our legal system and
society as a whole are reckoning with the legacy of colonialism.
B.

Taxing Authorities in Indian Country

There are multiple potential taxing authorities within Indian Country.45 The
federal government; state and local governments, and tribes themselves all have
potential taxing authorities. The federal government’s taxing authority is beyond the
scope of this article.46 This section explains tribal taxing authority and limitations;
state and local taxing authority and expansions; the historic tension and recent
litigation; why the potential double taxation is a problem; and the role of compacts
in ameliorating the double tax problem.
The law in this area reflects the historical context explained above. During
the first part of the United States’ history, there was a bright line delineating the
boundaries of state and tribal taxing authority, respectively.47 When federal Indian
policy shifted away from both promoting tribal self-governance and ensuring federal
government engagement to the exclusion of states, state and local civil and criminal
jurisdiction within Indian Country expanded.48 With the expansion of state civil
jurisdiction generally, states and local governments began to exercise taxing
authority in Indian Country and the tribal authority to tax was gradually eroded. The
historical context also highlights how the status of the land on which a transaction

43. See CANBY, supra note 1, at 35–39.
44. HARVARD PROJECT ON AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE STATE OF THE
NATIVE NATIONS: CONDITIONS UNDER US POLICIES OF SELF-DETERMINATION, xix (Oxford Univ. Press
2008).
45. Because the issue of what constitutes a tax and the purposes taxation serve is not a simple matter,
some explanation may be useful at this juncture. Generally, taxation serves four governmental functions
that sometimes overlap. Barsh, supra note 3, at 534. Taxes serve to create revenue streams, regulate
business, redistribute wealth, and as a tool for fiscal stabilization. Id. For purposes of this article, the taxes
at issue are generally for the purposes of funding government revenue needs.
46. As a general rule, the federal government has full taxing authority within Indian Country, whether
exercised over non-Indians or tribes or Indians as individuals. See CANBY supra note 1, at 295. The federal
government has permitted or allowed exemptions for some types of taxes against tribes and also
exemptions from tax on some types of income derived by tribes and their members. Id. at 296–97.
47. Scott A. Taylor, The Unending Onslaught on Tribal Sovereignty: State Income Taxation on NonMember Indians, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 917, 927 (“In these early years, states refrained from attempting to
tax tribes, their lands, or people who were within tribal boundaries.”). Professor Taylor analyzed the
powers of the federal government with exclusive authority to manage Indian affairs in the Constitution as
compared to under the Articles of Confederation. Id. at 924–28.
48. See supra Part II.A, note 38 and accompanying text.
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occurs and the political status of the individual or entity engaged in the transaction
are critical factors in the analysis of whether a government has taxing authority
within Indian Country.
A caveat is necessary here: this is only a summary of the law governing
state and tribal taxing authority in Indian Country. The law in this area is complex
and there are many thorough treatises on the topic.49
1.

Tribal taxing authority

A tribe’s power to tax depends on the persons or activity sought to be taxed
and the location of the persons or activity. The power of a tribe to impose taxes over
its own citizens or within its own territory is a fundamental attribute of tribal
sovereignty.50
Generally, tribes also have the authority to tax transactions involving nonmembers that occur within their reservation.51 A tribe’s civil regulatory authority
over non-members exists when the transaction occurs on reservation trust land, a
consensual contractual agreement between the non-member and tribe exists, or when
the activity being taxed has a direct effect on “the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”52 In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
the Supreme Court upheld a tribal severance tax imposed on non-Indian oil
companies engaged in the production and extraction of natural gas on tribal land.53
The Court in Merrion held the Tribe had the “inherent power” to tax the non-member
entity, “whether this power derive[d] from the Tribe’s power of self-government or
from the Tribe’s power to exclude” non-members.54
Tribal authority to impose tax within their territorial boundaries is not
without limitations. One such limitation is legal in nature, and the other set of
limitations are practical constraints.
a.

Legal limitations on a tribe’s power to tax – the “Atkinson Problem”

The Supreme Court has limited a tribe’s authority in significant ways. For
example, in Atkinson Trading Post v. Arizona State Tax Commission, the Supreme
Court held that a tribe could not impose a tribal tax on occupants of a hotel owned

49. In 1979, Professor Barsh described the state of the law in this arena as “aggravating,” and a
“willy-nilly . . . tangle.” Barsh, supra note 3, at 533. See also Richard D. Pomp, The Unfulfilled Promise
of the Indian Commerce Clause and State Taxation, 63 TAX LAW. 897 (2010) (cataloging the history from
prior to the revolutionary war until present day in Professor Pomp’s seminal work); COHEN, supra note
1, at §8.
50. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Rsrv., 447 U.S. 134, 152–53 (1980)
(holding that a tribe can impose a tax on cigarettes on its own members). In Colville, the Court noted that
Congress has the ability to divest a tribe of its authority to tax. Id.
51. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 140–41 (1982).
52. This test is from the seminal case, Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981), which
articulated the extent of tribal authority over non-members generally. Note that the test from Montana
regarding activities that affect “the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of
the tribe” has been narrowly construed. Id. at 566.
53. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. at 159.
54. Id. at 149. The Court also addressed the lack of any express divestment of tax power by Congress.
Id. at 149–52.
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by a non-Indian that was located on fee land within the reservation.55 The result in
Atkinson—circumscribing a tribe’s authority because the tribe lacked ownership
over the fee land within its reservation—is a direct consequence of the historical
Allotment and Termination eras in which Indian land was allotted and allowed to be
sold in fee to non-Indians.56
The Court’s focus on land status in Atkinson represents modern
jurisprudence accommodating the realities of the history of allotment and principles
of integration.57 In a recent United States Supreme Court case, McGirt v. Oklahoma,
the Court appears to shift away from a focus on land status, instead focusing on
principles of territorial sovereignty, treaty language, and historical promises made to
a tribe.58 Whether McGirt represents a sea change in Supreme Court jurisprudence
in Indian law remains to be seen.59 It does not alter the law articulated in Atkinson.
Tribal taxing authority is still limited based on land status within the reservation
boundaries, negatively impacting tribes’ ability to raise revenue.
b.

Practical constraints on a tribe’s ability to raise revenue include lack of
available revenue base.

As a practical matter, tribes may not be able to raise revenue by imposing a
tax because the tribe lacks an available revenue base. Two state and local revenue
sources are not available to tribes. States derive much of their tax revenue—almost
20 percent—from individual income taxes.60 Although tribes have the authority to
impose income taxes on their members, many individuals living within Indian
Country do not have significant income to tax nor are tribal governments interested
in assessing or collecting taxes from their own members.61 States and localities are
also heavily reliant on property tax revenue.62 Tribes cannot tax much of their
reservation land because it is held in trust by the federal government.63 Even if the
land is held in fee by individual tribal members, imposing a tax against its own
55. Atkinson Trading Post v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 647 (2001).
56. See supra Part II.A, notes 29–35 and accompanying text. The outcome in Atkinson was foreseen
by the rules articulated in Montana v. United States. In Montana, the Court noted that a tribe lacks
authority over parcels of non-Indian fee land even though they are within the reservation’s broader
boundaries. 450 U.S. at 565–66. But see Florey, supra note 9, at 406 (proposing an expansion of the
interpretation of the second Montana exception given the realities of COVID-19).
57. Blackhawk, supra note 11, at 1798 (explaining how “[i]ntegrationist, rights-based
frameworks . . . are feared in Indian law, rather than celebrated”).
58. McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2476 (2020).
59. For recent commentary on the impact of McGirt on future federal Indian law doctrine, see Dylan
R. Hedden-Nicely & Stacy L. Leeds, A Familiar Crossroads: McGirt v. Oklahoma and the Future of the
Federal Indian Law Canon, 51 N.M. L. REV. 300 (2021) (examining recent history of federal Indian law
jurisprudence and contextualizing the likelihood of a shift in future decisions); Robert J. Miller, McGirt
v. Oklahoma: The Indian Law Bombshell, THE FED. LAW., Mar.–Apr. 2021, at 31 (predicting possible
ramifications to existing law of both civil and criminal jurisdiction within Indian Country).
60. State and Local Revenues, URBAN INST., https://www.urban.org/policy-centers/cross-centerinitiatives/state-and-local-finance-initiative/state-and-local-backgrounders/state-and-local-revenues.
61. CANBY, supra note 1, at 314.
62. Local governments derive up to thirty percent of their tax revenue from property taxes. See
Property Taxes, URBAN INST., https://www.urban.org/policy-centers/cross-center-initiatives/state-andlocal-finance-initiative/projects/state-and-local-backgrounders/property-taxes.
63. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
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members is not a viable option.64 As explained below, a third practical constraint
occurs when a tribe has the legal authority and potential tax base but has, at least
potentially, overlapping jurisdiction with a state or local government.
2.

State and local governments’ taxing authority in Indian Country

States have the authority to tax persons, transactions, and property within
their borders.65 However, state taxing authority generally does not extend into a
tribe’s territorial boundaries.66 Categorically, states and local governments lack the
authority to legally impose taxes on tribes or tribal members inside Indian Country.67
States cannot tax tribally-sourced income earned by a member of such tribe if the
tribal member resides within the tribe’s territory.68 This categorical prohibition
depends on who bears the legal incidence of the tax. Legal incidence refers to the
entity or individual the tax is legally imposed upon, not to the entity or individual
required to collect or remit the tax.69 Legal incidence of a tax is a formalistic inquiry
that does not address economic incidence, or the concept of who bears the economic
cost or burden of a tax.70 Given that legal incidence can be manipulated, states are
free to draft around the doctrine.71
If the legal incidence of a state tax falls on non-Indians or non-member
Indians, there is no categorical prohibition on the state tax.72 In such cases, the
validity of the state tax turns on whether, 1) the tax infringes on tribal selfgovernment, and 2) the tax is otherwise preempted by federal law.73
Addressing the latter first, Williams v. Lee, which was not a tax case,
articulated a broad rule that state action cannot infringe on the right of a tribe to make

64. See CANBY, supra note 1, at 314.
65. States have the powers not delegated to the federal government nor expressly prohibited. U.S.
CONST. amend. X. See also COHEN, supra note 1, §8.03[1][a], 696 nn.2–4 and accompanying text.
66. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 458 (1995).
67. See id. In Chickasaw Nation, the Court noted two ways in which a state would have taxing
authority over tribes or tribal members within Indian Country: by Congressional permission in federal
statute or by other “cession of jurisdiction.” Id. at 458–59 (internal quotation omitted) (quoting County of
Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 258 (1992)). States may tax
property owned by non-Indians within Indian Country. See Utah & N. Ry. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885).
68. See McClanahan v. Ariz. Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973).
69. See CANBY, supra note 1, at 306. See also COHEN, supra note 1, §8.03[1][b], 698 nn.18–22 and
accompanying text.
70. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 460 (“If we were to make ‘economic reality’ our guide, we might
be obliged to consider, for example, how completely retailers can pass along tax increases without
sacrificing sales volume—a complicated matter dependent on the characteristics of the market for the
relevant product.”).
71. Id. (“[I]f a State is unable to enforce a tax because the legal incidence of the impost is on Indians
or Indian tribes, the State generally is free to amend its law to shift the tax’s legal incidence.”).
72. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Rsrv., 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
73. The first case in which preemption was considered was Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax
Commission, 380 U.S. 685 (1965). In Warren Trading Post, the court prohibited state gross receipts tax
on the earnings of a non-Indian operating a trading post on the Navajo Reservation. Id. at 691–92. The
court interpreted the extensive federal licensing required for Indian traders as preempting states from
creating any “additional burdens” through state taxes. Id. at 690.
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its own laws and be subject to such laws.74 The Supreme Court in Williams held that
Arizona courts lacked jurisdiction to hear a dispute brought by a non-Indian against
a member of the Navajo nation for a dispute that arose on the Navajo reservation.75
While, as a jurisdictional doctrine, it sounds promising to support tribal sovereignty,
Professor Pomp described the test in Williams as “an amorphous, subjective test and
one (with the benefit of hindsight) that has not favored the tribes.”76 To the contrary,
the application of Williams v. Lee, has not been broadly interpreted as to state actions
that constitute infringement.77 Suffice it to say, though testing whether a state tax
infringes on a tribe’s ability to make its own laws and be subject to such laws is part
of the legal doctrine, no tax case between a tribe and state or local government has
been decided in favor of a tribe to prohibit the state or local tax based on principles
of infringement.78
The former inquiry—whether a state or local tax is preempted by federal
law—is the de facto jurisprudential test applied in disputes between a tribe and state
over the state’s assertion of taxing authority over non-Indians engaging in business
in Indian Country.79 The preemption analysis is also one of the reasons why state
taxation authority is such a complex issue.80 The so-called “preemption analysis” is
really a balancing test weighing state and tribal interests. In a transaction within
Indian Country involving only members of a tribe, the state has no interest and the
federal government has a strong interest in promoting tribal self-governance.81 In
cases involving state tax imposed on non-Indians, the state’s interest, according to
the Supreme Court, requires analysis of a “particularized inquiry into the nature of
the state, federal, and tribal interest at stake, an inquiry designed to determine
whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate federal
law.”82 The factors examined in this “particularized inquiry” include the extent of
federal regulation and control of the activity the state seeks to tax, the regulatory and
revenue-raising interest of states and tribes, and the existence and extent of state or
tribal services.83

74. 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (“There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction
here would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would infringe
on the right of the Indians to govern themselves.”).
75. Id. at 217–18, 223.
76. POMP, supra note 49, at 1001 nn.402–403 and accompanying text.
77. Id. at 1001 n.404 and accompanying text.
78. See Fletcher, supra note 7, at 804–05 (arguing revival of the application of the test in Williams v.
Lee would allow for tribes to demonstrate the impossibility of governing without the ability to generate
revenue).
79. Professor Pomp’s commentary emphasizes that the Bracker preemption analysis (explained in
detail below) “has come to overshadow the Williams v. Lee infringement test.” POMP, supra note 49, at
1131.
80. See generally, Pomp, supra note 49, at 903–04 (“[T]he issues raised by the taxation of Indians,
the tribes, and those doing business with them are sui generis – and complicated, even by tax standards.”).
81. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144 (1980) (citing Moe v. Confederated
Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Rsrv., 425 U.S. 463, 480–81 (1976); and then McClanahan v. Ariz.
Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973)).
82. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 145.
83. Id. at 148–51.
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Courts have applied the preemption analysis to invalidate state taxes in
Indian Country. In White Mountain Apache, the Court applied the preemption
analysis and invalidated a state motor carrier license or use fuel tax on non-Indian
logging businesses operating on tribal roads.84 Additionally, courts have prohibited
state gross receipts taxes imposed on non-Indian businesses providing services for
tribes,85 sales taxes imposed on selling goods to Indians and tribes within a
reservation,86 and motor fuel distributor taxes imposed on sales to tribal retailers.87
Applying the preemption test has also led courts to uphold the validity of
state taxes. Courts have upheld state sales taxes on cigarette sales to non-members,88
state severance taxes on extraction of oil and gas on Indian reservations,89 and state
taxes on non-Indians imposed on sales of coal,90 among other types of business and
transaction taxes imposed on non-Indians transacting in Indian country.
The recent case of Tulalip Tribe v. Washington is an example of a federal
court allowing state taxation in Indian Country.91 That case involved the Tulalip
Tribe’s development of commercial and retail space on land owned by the Tribe but
held in trust by the federal government.92 The Tribe leased retail and commercial
space to many non-Indian businesses and the state of Washington and Snohomish
county imposed various state and county taxes on those non-Indian businesses.93 In
its analysis, the district court held that federal law did not preempt the state and local
taxes through a pervasive regulatory scheme.94 Furthermore, in balancing the tribal
versus state interests, the court found that the state and local governments provided
sufficient services to the Tribe and those participating in the business at the
commercial development made by the Tribe, that “more than justif[ied] imposition
of the taxes at issue.”95 The district court upheld the state and local taxes despite the
finding of extensive infrastructure costs that were supported by minimal state
monies.96 Tulalip Tribe is a recent example of the litigation over the reach of state
taxation in Indian Country and how state taxing authority diminishes tribal
sovereignty. The preemption analysis has led to much litigation that continues to the
present day.
3.

Judicial doctrines diminish tribal taxing authority which reduces
opportunities for economic development within Indian Country and

84. Id. at 137–38.
85. Ramah Navajo School Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 834 (1982).
86. Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685, 685–86 (1965).
87. Herzog Bros. Trucking, Inc. v. State Tax Comm’n, 533 N.E.2d 255, 256 (N.Y. 1988).
88. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Rsrv., 447 U.S. 134, 159 (1980).
89. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 186 (1989).
90. Peabody Coal Co. v. State, 761 P.2d 1094, 1101 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
91. 349 F. Supp. 3d 1046, 1062–63 (W.D. Wash. 2018).
92. Id. at 1049.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1056–57.
95. Id. at 1062.
96. Id. at 1051. The Tribe contributed 76 percent of the financing necessary for building the
infrastructure costs to create the commercial center. Id. The federal government contributed 19 percent,
and the state contributed the remaining 5 percent of the cost. Id.

14

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 52

erodes tribal sovereignty.
The argument and analysis infra are based primarily on problems that occur
in the subset of tax cases in which either, 1) the tribe lacks taxing authority within
the reservation, or 2) the state or local government has potential authority to impose
a tax on non-Indians transacting in Indian Country where the tribe has overlapping
jurisdiction. These two issues create similar yet distinct problems for tribal
sovereignty, complicating and reducing a tribe’s ability to engage in economic
development. Those differences are key to understanding the proposed solutions.
Although both types of cases diminish a tribe’s tax base, the diminishment
occurs for different reasons. In the first type of cases, where a tribe lacks jurisdiction
to tax on non-Indian businesses located on fee land within a reservation (the
“Atkinson problem”), the tribe’s tax base is reduced as a matter of law. The second
type of cases, where a state or local government asserts taxing authority over a
transaction occurring within the tribe’s territory that a tribe indisputably has taxing
authority over (the “potential double tax problem”), the reduction in a tribe’s tax base
is not legally restricted, but it is diminished as a practical matter.
If a state successfully manipulates the legal incidence of a tax imposed in
Indian Country onto non-Indians (and the tax is not preempted or deemed to infringe
on the tribe under the White Mountain Apache analysis), the practical realities of the
potential double tax forces tribes to make choices in which they cannot win
economically. Regardless of who bears the legal incidence of a tax, the consumer
always bears the economic incidence which drives up the cost of consumer goods
and impacts consumer choices.97 Increased cost of doing business in Indian Country
disincentivizes outside investment in Indian Country, which in turn reduces
economic activity in Indian Country altogether.98
The question of whether a state or local government has taxing authority in
Indian Country is a question historically answered by the courts.99 As explained
above regarding the cases interpreting the preemption standard in White Mountain
Apache, the standard has been applied to surprising and somewhat conflicting
outcomes.100 Surprising is never a positive way to describe tax consequences—any
surprise violates the fundamental tax policy principle that tax systems “ought to be
clear and plain.”101 Any uncertainty costs are also borne by tribes, with states having
nothing to lose to assert a tax knowing that litigation is time-consuming and

97. For an excellent discussion of this problem, see Crepelle, supra note 7, at 1016–18 & nn.137–47.
98. This “double bind” problem is well documented in both legal scholarship and the economic
literatures on hurdles to improving economic conditions in Indian Country. Kelly S. Croman & Jonathan
B. Taylor, Why Beggar thy Indian Neighbor? The Case for Tribal Primacy in Taxation in Indian Country,
THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA NATIVE NATIONS INSTITUTE 17–19 (May 4, 2016),
http://nni.arizona.edu/application/files/8914/6254/9090/2016_Croman_why_beggar_thy_Indian_neighb
or.pdf. (“Double taxation puts tribal governments in a double bind: Levy a tax to recover investments in
development and cause businesses to flee, or do not levy a tax and fail to recover the costs of investing in
development.”). See also Cowan, supra note 8, at 94 (noting that double taxation, or the possibility thereof,
disincentivizes non-Indian investment in reservation businesses).
99. See Cowan supra note 8. See also Pomp, supra note 49.
100. See supra Part II.B.2 and text accompanying notes 84–96.
101. Mark J. Cowan, Taxing Cannabis on the Reservation, 57 AM. BUS. L.J. 867, 898 (2020) (quoting
ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776)).
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expensive. Such uncertainty of potential double taxation deters much outside
investment in Indian Country.102
Ultimately, in such double tax cases, if a state even asserts taxing authority
in Indian Country, the tribe has to choose between imposing its tax, creating a
duplicative tax which will deter business activity, or not imposing its tax and
foregoing revenue.103 Some tax experts have recommended non-Indian investors or
businesses to seek exception to tribal tax regimens to ensure duplicative taxes will
not be imposed on businesses within Indian Country.104 For the tribe, it is a lose-lose
proposition—lose the business activity that generates revenue or lose the tax
revenue. Scholars have pointed out how such double taxation is not tolerated in
multi-state or international tax arenas because of the potential for economic harm.105
The Atkinson problem also creates a problem that can result in behavioral
distortions. If a hotel on fee land owned by non-Indians does not impose a tribal hotel
tax on guests whereas a hotel across the street located on tribally-owned land (or
trust land) does impose a tax on guests, potential guests will prefer the hotel where
no tax is imposed, making their decisions based on tax implications.106 From an
economic perspective, consumers should make their decisions independent of tax
implications.107 Varied tax consequences in a close geographical area “distort the
free market geographic allocation of capital, labor, and technology.”108
In both of these types of cases—the Atkinson problem and the double tax
problem—a tribe’s taxing authority is diminished while a state’s taxing authority
encroaches on the tribe. The Atkinson problem is geo-political; the tribe’s own
authority to govern within its territory is legally reduced. In the double tax problem,
while the tribe’s ability to impose its own laws is not reduced, the impact is

102. For a complete discussion of the economic consequences of double taxation or the prospect of
double taxation, see Croman & Taylor, supra note 98, at 1–24.
103. See, e.g., Tulalip Tribes v. Washington, 349 F. Supp. 3d 1046, at 1059 (W.D. Wash. 2018)
(acknowledging this practical limitation by stating that “the only tribal interest the State and County taxes
actually ‘interfere or are incompatible with’ is the Tribes’ ability to collect the full measure of its own
sales tax from the non-Indian businesses.”).
104. Erik M. Jensen, Taxation and Doing Business in Indian Country, 60 ME. L. REV. 1, 8 (2008)
(describing the state tax applicability as certain and suggesting a potential investor in Indian Country could
negotiate with tribal governments to “lessen any otherwise applicable tribal taxation.”).
105. See Crepelle, supra note 7, at 1017. See also Cowan, supra note 98, at 126–27 (explaining
nuances in comparison of double tax regimes between foreign governments versus tribes and states).
106. The caselaw itself acknowledges that a government imposing no or lower tax rates compared to
neighboring jurisdictions have a competitive advantage. See Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes of Flathead Rsrv., 425 U.S. 463, 482. Under the common law, tribal governments are prohibited
from using tax arbitrage to attract customers. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Indian Rsrv., 447 U.S. 134, 155 (1980) (“[F]ederal Indian law . . . [does not] authorize Indian tribes . . .
to market an exemption from state taxation. . . . “). A double standard exists with respect to tribes because
these distortions are permitted or tolerated when states make choices to market their tax exemption,
beyond the Atkinson problem. See Crepelle, supra note 7, at 1014, n.126 (giving examples of states using
tax arbitrage to attract business).
107. Cf. Barsh, supra note 3, at 542–44 (discussing the consequences of “tax geography” that arise
when “coequal political subdivisions” compete for the same tax base).
108. Id. at 544.
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functionally equivalent to legal reduction. Both problems present encroachment
which reduces tribal sovereignty.109
4.

Intergovernmental tax compacts as a solution to the double tax
problem.

An extrajudicial solution to the double tax problem is for states and tribes
to enter into tax revenue compacts.110 Such compacts are negotiated agreements
between the tribal government and the state to resolve both jurisdictional and
substantive legal matters.111 Over 200 tribes have entered into tax revenue compacts
with more than eighteen states.112
Tax revenue compacts between states and tribes generally establish
“political policies,” such as the inherent sovereignty of tribes and tribal exemption
from state taxation, generally; address sovereign immunity issues; and spell out
terms relating to revenue.113 Some compacts require tribes to impose and collect
taxes at least equal to a similar tax imposed by the state.114 The revenue sharing
arrangements on that tax imposed vary—from allowing a tribe to retain 100 percent
of the revenue generated by the tribe to requiring the tribe to remit taxes to the state
and then receive a remitted allocation of the tax revenue according to enrolled tribal
populations.115
Compacts have been heralded as the best mechanism for tribes to provide
certainty and avoid litigation on matters of state taxation within their territory.116
Benefits to compacting include creating certainty for tribes to “plan for the future”
and create revenue streams that will support business development, financing for
109. The literature is replete with criticisms of the doctrine in this area. See Fletcher, supra note 7, at
802–05 (offering solutions to reform the law in the area of state tax in Indian Country, including the option
of courts to “[r]evive the ‘tribal infringement’ test of Williams v. Lee.”).
Again, this article seeks not to “fix” the jurisprudence, but offers an extrajudicial policy solution akin to
the framework offered by Professor Blackhawk. Blackhawk, supra note 11, at 1797 (“It has often been
said that federal Indian law is ‘incoherent’ and in need of reform, because the doctrine does not comport
with general public law principles. But perhaps it is the general principles of public law . . . that are in
need of reform.”. To that end, Professor Blackhawk notes how “Indian law unsettles . . . presuppositions
about how best to distribute and limit power in order to protect minorities,” documenting how “national
oversight, rights-based frameworks, and judicial solicitude” have failed Indian Country. Id. Certainly in
the context of the (over)reaches of state taxation in Indian Country, the federal judiciary has been the
proverbial nail in the coffin for tribal governments to develop tribal tax revenue streams.
110. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Power to Tax, The Power to Destroy, And the Michigan Tribal-State
Tax Agreements, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 4 (2004) (“Voluntary agreement is by far the best method
for Indian tribes to settle a dispute with state governments.”).
111. Note, Intergovernmental Compacts in Native American Law: Models for Expanded Usage, 112
HARV. L. REV. 922, 924 (1999).
112. Tax Fairness and Tax Base Protection: Hearings on H.R. 1168 Before the H. Comm. on Res.,
105th Cong. (1998) (statement of W. Ron Allen, president of the Nat’l. Cong. of Am. Indians).
113. Cowan, supra note 8, at 133–34.
114. Id. at 134.
115. Id. at 134 & n.216 (“Under some compacts, tribes have agreed to charge a tax that is at least equal
to the state tax . . . and in exchange the states have allowed the tribes to retain 100% of the tax.”).
116. See Cowan, supra note 8, at 134. See also Richard J. Ansson Jr., State Taxation of Non-Indians
Whom Do Business with Indian Tribes: Why Several Recent Ninth Circuit Holdings Reemphasize the Need
for Indian Tribes to Enter Into Taxation Compacts with Their Respective State, 78 OR. L. REV. 501 (1999)
(advocating for tribes to compact with states).
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projects, and ensure ability for the tribe to provide services to tribal members.117
Depending on the terms of the agreements, compacts may offer increases in
revenue.118 There is also the hope that as states and tribes cooperate in tax revenue
sharing agreements, states and tribes will enter into cooperative agreements in other
areas of the law, such as zoning, law enforcement, and environmental regulation.119
Compacts also have downsides. The outcome and terms of a compact vary
tremendously based on the willingness of the state to agree to favorable terms and
the tribe’s own political bargaining power.120 Compacting requires that tribes
concede or waive sovereign immunity, at least in part, which allows state
encroachment of civil and criminal jurisdiction.121 Compacting also often permits
state taxation within Indian Country or it allows the state to dictate terms of tribal
taxation, eroding tribal sovereignty.122
Compacting represents a cooperative solution that has similar attributes to
the proposals set forth in the analysis infra.123 However, compacts have not
sufficiently solved the problem and cannot do so.124 Economic development requires
both creating business investment and drawing tax revenues from those activities or
investments. Compacting will always require concessions of sovereignty that
undermine a tribe’s ability to generate revenue.125
C.

COVID-19 has disproportionately impacted Native American Indians
and tribal governments compared to non-Indian communities.

The COVID-19 pandemic has had a disproportionate effect on American
Indian individuals and tribal communities.126 This reality reflects, in part, the fact
that tribal governments “navigate a tricky legal and political environment.”127 This
part provides background on the disparate impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on

117. Fletcher, supra note 110, at 44.
118. Id.
119. Id. This idea for “cooperative sovereignty” was championed as by Justice Gorsuch in the majority
opinion in McGirt v. Oklahoma. 591 U.S. 1, 41 (2020). The court cited the fact that Oklahoma “has
negotiated hundreds of intergovernmental agreements with tribes.” Id. Although in the context of
Professor Fletcher’s article on tribal-state revenue compacts, the agreements were a collaborative
negotiation of a number of tribes and the state of Michigan. Fletcher, supra note 110, at 5–6. As states
and tribes engage in compacting around tax revenue, there is the hope that more states and tribes are
enticed to do so.
120. Cowan, supra note 8, at 134.
121. Fletcher, supra note 110, at 44.
122. See Fletcher, supra note 110, at 44.
123. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.d.
124. Id.
125. Fletcher, supra note 7, at 805 (“The ability of an Indian tribe to raise revenues that will adequately
fund tribal government services such as housing, health care, social services, education, law enforcement
and public safety, youth and elder services, and even job creation is a right of self-government.”).
126. See generally DOSHI ET AL., supra note 10.
127. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Indian Lives Matter: Pandemics and Inherent Tribal Powers, 73 STAN.
L. REV. ONLINE 38 (2020), https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/indian-lives-matter/. See also
Katherine Florey, Toward Tribal Regulatory Sovereignty in the Wake of the COVID-19 Pandemic, 63
ARIZ L. REV. 399 (2021) (calling for expanding tribal regulatory authority over non-members under
Montana exception for “health and welfare” of the tribe).
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tribes and their people in terms of both health and economic outcomes. It documents
some of the disputes that have arisen between states as tribes have exercised their
sovereignty during the pandemic.
1.

Disparate impact in health outcomes

The disparate impact of COVID-19 within Indian Country is perhaps most
visible in the comparative statistics of infection and mortality rates of the virus
among Native American Indians compared with non-Native individuals.128 Early in
the pandemic, virus infection rates on tribal lands were more than four times higher
than in the rest of the United States.129 According to data from the United States
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “the COVID-19 incidence and mortality
(55.8 per 100,000) rates in Native Americans and Alaska Natives are 3.5 and 1.8
times those measured in Whites, respectively.”130
It is impossible to generalize the direct causes of the disparity. Public health
scholars identify factors that contribute to the health issues faced by Native
Americans, which include “(1) limited access to appropriate health facilities; poor
access to health insurance . . . 3) insufficient federal funding [for federal Indian
Health Service] 4) inadequate quality of care; and 5) insufficient education and
poverty.”131 The last reason—widespread poverty—is inextricably connected to
128. DOSHI ET AL., supra note 10, at 1 (highlighting data as of June 18, 2020, showing Navajo Nation
had highest infection rate in the United States and Native people make up only 0.1 percent of population
of New Mexico but more than 55 percent of the coronavirus cases in the state. Id. (The rate of infection
of COVID-19 among Native American Indian and Alaska Natives is three times that of whites, resulting
in hospitalization rates more than 5.3 times higher than that of whites and dying at 1.4 times the rate of
whites). See also Kalen Goodluck, Lucy Meyer, & Anjali Shrivastava, A Crude Virus: How ‘Man Camps’
Can
Cause
a
COVID
Surge,
HIGH
COUNTRY
NEWS
(Jan.
8,
2021),
https://www.hcn.org/articles/indigenous-affairs-covid19-a-crude-virus-how-man-camps-can-cause-acovid-surge.
129. Stephanie Russo Carroll et al., Indigenous Data in the COVID-19 Pandemic: Straddling Erasure,
Terrorism, and Sovereignty, SOC. SCI. RSCH. COUNCIL (June 11, 2020), https://items.ssrc.org/covid-19and-the-social-sciences/disaster-studies/indigenous-data-in-the-covid-19-pandemic-straddling-erasureterrorism-and-sovereignty/ (full data on infections and mortality among Native American Indian
individuals remain elusive due to fluidity of tribal residency, but it is certainly lower than reported data).
130. Gabriella Y. Meltzer et al., Environmentally Marginalized Populations: the “perfect storm” for
infectious disease pandemics, including COVID-19, J. OF HEALTH DISPARITIES RSCH. and PRAC.,
https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/jhdrp/vol13/iss4/6. This data is corroborated in a number of studies
also by the CDC or other governmental entity. See also Jessica Arrazola, et al., Covid-19 Mortality Among
Americans Indian and Alaskan Native Persons – 14 States, January–June 2020, CTR. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL
and
PREVENTION
1,
(Dec.
11,
2020)
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/pdfs/mm6949a3-H.pdf (“A recent analysis found that the
cumulative incidence of laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 cases among AI/AN persons was 3.5 times that
among White persons. Among 14 participating states, the age-adjusted AI/AN COVID-19 mortality rate
(55.8 deaths per 100,000; 95% confidence interval [CI] = 52.5–59.3) was 1.8 (95% CI = 1.7–2.0) times
that among White persons (30.3 deaths per 100,000; 95% CI = 29.9–30.7.” A closer look at the data
reveals that the disparities between AI/AN and white populations are greater among younger people.
“Although COVID-19 mortality rates increased with age among both AI/AN and White persons, the
disparity was largest among those aged 20–49 years. Among persons aged 20–29 years, 30–39 years, and
40–49 years, the COVID-19 mortality rates among AI/AN were 10.5, 11.6, and 8.2 times, respectively,
those among White persons.”).
131. Ayeisha Cox, The State of Tribal Health: The Affordable Care Act’s Effect on Tribal Health Care
Systems, WIDNER J. L. ECON. & RACE, Dec. 1, 2014, at 1, 13.
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economic conditions on reservations, which, as explained above, is a result of the
history of colonialism and inconsistent federal support.132
Problems related to depressed economic conditions, such as lack of
infrastructure and rural, geographically isolated reservations, also contribute to the
disparate impact.133 For example, data showed that one third of Navajo Nation
residents “live without electricity, paved roads, cellphone service, landlines, safe
housing, or other essentials of modern life.”134
The harms of the increased mortality in Indian Country as a result of the
pandemic extend into the fabric of the existence of tribal nations. The deaths of many
Native American Indian elders amount to a “cultural crisis,” not only because of the
elders’ depth of knowledge of tribal language and customs, but also because of the
important leadership role elders play in many tribal nations.135
As the pandemic has progressed, one very bright spot for tribes has been
the efficiency with which tribes have mobilized members for vaccination.136 Tribes
outpaced state counterparts in terms of getting vaccines into the arms of their
citizens.137 Vaccination has been accomplished with tribal direction and is evidence
that tribal sovereignty and self-governance works.138
2.

Disparate impact on economic conditions

The economic conditions within Indian Country stemming from COVID19 are intertwined with the disparate impact COVID-19 has on the physical health
of Native American populations. Although some of the economic downturn in Indian
Country could be attributed to economic conditions in broader society, such as
decrease in oil and gas extraction as a result of reduction in travel, the economic

132. See id. For the history of fluctuating federal policies that created current conditions in Indian
Country, see also Fletcher, supra note 8, at 102.
133. Meltzer
et
al.,
supra
note
130
(link between poor public health outcomes and the environmental conditions is also noteworthy and the
literature notes environmental toxin exposures). See also Warigia M. Bowman, Dikos Nitsaa’igii-19 (The
Big Cough): Coal, Covid, and the Navajo Nation (forthcoming, not yet published) (connecting COVID19’s spread on the Navajo Nation in part based on “high levels of pollution from uranium mining, oil and
gas well, and coal mining.”).
134. Id.
135. Jack Healy, Tribal Elders Are Dying from the Pandemic, Causing a Cultural Crisis for American
Indians, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/12/us/tribal-elders-nativeamericans-coronavirus.html.
136. Kirk Siegler, Why Native Americans Are Getting COVID-19 Vaccines Faster, NPR, (Feb. 19,
2021),
https://www.npr.org/2021/02/19/969046248/why-native-americans-are-getting-the-covid-19vaccines-faster.
137. See Rima Krisst, Navajo outpacing states in rate of vaccinations, NAVAJO TIMES, (Mar. 9, 2021),
https://navajotimes.com/reznews/navajo-outpacing-states-in-rate-of-vaccinations/; see also Brian Bull,
Tribes Report Successes in COVID-19 Vaccine Rollout, THE OREGONIAN, (Mar. 12, 2021),
https://www.oregonlive.com/coronavirus/2021/03/tribes-report-successes-in-covid-19-vaccinerollout.html; Jack Healy, Plenty of Vaccines, but Not Enough Arms: A Warning Sign in Cherokee Nation,
N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 16, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/16/us/vaccines-covid-cherokee-nativeamericans.html, (“It is a side effect of early successes.”).
138. See Krisst, supra note 137.
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“shut downs,” were largely attempts to mitigate the spread of the virus.139 Aware that
stringent closures result in economic losses, tribes have chosen to protect human life
over revenues. The Blackfeet Nation, located in Montana and adjacent to the eastern
side of Glacier National Park, remained closed and in lockdown even after the state
began to allow reopening after initial lockdowns in March 2020.140 Blackfeet’s
economy depends on tourism, mostly connected with neighboring Glacier National
Park.141 But, rather than allow the thousands of tourists flocking to Glacier’s east
entrances to cross the Blackfeet’s reservation, the Tribe closed the reservation
through the entire summer tourist season.142
Tribes that depend on tourism, hospitality, and gaming have closed their
businesses to stave off COVID-19 infections. Data shows that, as of June 2020, the
casino closures starting in March 2020 resulted in an “estimated loss of more than
$4.4 billion in economic activity [and] $997 million in lost wages.”143 A survey of
over 400 businesses in Indian Country found that about eighty percent of triballyowned small businesses reported losses as of July 2020.144 Businesses engaged in
“arts, entertainment, and recreation,” were hit especially hard.145 Another survey
found that, while 68 percent of Indian Country’s business experienced a decline of
at least 20 percent, 16 percent of surveyed businesses experienced a 100 percent loss
in revenue.146 One of the studies notes that layoffs and furloughs in Indian Country
were less common than in non-Indian businesses overall.147
In 2021, the federal government responded to the economic crisis of the
pandemic with the American Rescue Plan.148 The American Rescue Plan has buoyed
tribal governments with funding to mitigate the “fiscal effects” of COVID-19 on
139. Frank Schneider & Allie Schwartz, The New World of COVID-19: Paradigm Shifts in the Oil and
Gas Industry, NAT’L. L. REV. (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/new-world-covid19-paradigm-shifts-oil-and-gas-industry, (“The historic collapse in demand due to COVID-19 restrictions
on travel and the general decline in economic activity” shocked the oil and gas industry.).
140. Kathleen McLaughlin, A Closed Border, Pandemic-Weary Tourists and a Big Bottleneck at
Glacier National Park, WASH. POST (July 11, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/a-closedborder-pandemic-weary-tourists-and-a-big-bottleneck-at-glacier-national-park/2020/07/10/607694f2c2c0-11ea-b4f6-cb39cd8940fb_story.html.
141. Victor Yvellez, Virus Fight: Blackfeet Covid Restrictions Take Toll, MISSOULIAN (Oct. 27,
2020),
https://missoulian.com/news/local/virus-fight-blackfeet-covid-restrictions-taketoll/article_53f48d1a-6d3b5066-a358-c0e6d68c35c6.html.
142. Id.
143. DOSHI ET AL., supra note 10, at 1.
144. Donna Feir et al., Indian Country small businesses face strong headwinds in Covid-19 recovery,
FED.
RESERVE
BANK
OF
MINNEAPOLIS
(Sept.
8,
2020),
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/article/2020/indian-country-small-businesses-face-strong-headwindsin-covid-19-recovery.
145. Id. (“COVID-19 has affected some Indian Country businesses more than others. Fully four
months after the pandemic and associated public health measures forced many businesses to suspend
operations, 1 in 6 businesses reports having lost all of its revenue (as of mid-July) because of COVID19.”).
146. Survey Results Detail COVID-19’s Impact on Indian Country’s Economy, THE NAT’L CTR. FOR
AM. INDIAN ENTER. DEV., https://www.ncaied.org/survey-results-detail-covid-19s-impact-on-indiancountrys-economy/.
147. Feir et al., supra note 144.
148. American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2 (Mar. 11, 2021).
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tribal government revenues.149 It has also provided emergency funding for state and
local governments.150
3.

Poor public health and economic outcomes are correlated to state
encroachment on tribal sovereignty.

As the literature demonstrates, the public health situation in Indian Country
is worsened by constraints on tribal sovereignty, states’ expanding authority, and
tension between tribes and states.151 The federal government’s failure to meet its trust
obligation over centuries ultimately created conditions that allowed COVID-19 to
disparately impact tribes and Native American Indian peoples.152 Rather than truly
honor those obligations, the federal government, however, has “consistently fallen
short . . . by severely underfunding almost every dimension of the trust relationship
through budget cuts, neglect, and usurpation of sovereign authority.”153
One way that the federal government has failed to fully meet its trust
obligations is by tolerating, if not outright condoning, state encroachment on Indian
tribes’ sovereignty and jurisdictional authority.154 In such a vacuum of power, tribal
governments are at the political whim of the states in which the tribal nation is
geographically located.
The following examples of state-tribal relations are illustrative. Blackfeet’s
decision to close its reservation to outsiders was respected and supported by thenMontana Governor Steve Bullock.155 Other tribes, in exercise of their sovereignty,
made similar decisions to close their reservations and impose quarantines and
curfews—but were met with opposition and hostility from state and local leaders.
The Oglala Sioux and Cheyenne River Sioux Tribes of South Dakota, for example,
also restricted access through their reservations,156 but South Dakota Governor Kristi
Noem sought to prohibit them from enforcing their closures against non-members,
even going so far as requesting federal intervention.157 Another example of local
attempts to interfere with tribal sovereignty during the pandemic were letters from
New Mexico sheriffs to the Navajo police “insisting that the tribe refrain from citing

149. Id. sec. 9901, § 602(a)(1) (allocating $20 billion for States, territories, and tribes).
150. Id.
151. Florey, supra note 9, at 415–16, 434 (arguing that Montana framework for tribal authority hinders
effective self-governance and calls for expansion of the “health and welfare” exception under Montana
for stronger tribal power to safeguard public health); Bowman, supra note 133, at 7–9 (arguing for energy
policy changes on the Navajo Nation to mitigate and prevent public health crises such as COVID-19);
Fletcher, supra note 11, at 44–47 (arguing for increased tribal sovereignty to address the COVID-19
pandemic).
152. DOSHI ET AL., supra note 10, at 1–2 (“At the root of all these vulnerabilities are the broken
promises that the federal government made to tribes in the constitutional process of signing treaties to
acquire their lands. Tribes ceded huge swaths of land to the United States with the formal, treaty enshrined
understanding that the federal government would protect the tribes as sovereign political entities whose
right to self governance it would safeguard and to whom it would provide adequate resources to deliver
essential services.”).
153. Id. at 2.
154. Fletcher, supra note 9, at 38–41.
155. McLaughlin, supra note 140.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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nonmembers” during a tribe-instituted curfew to mitigate the spread of COVID19.158 State attempts to limit tribal sovereignty during the pandemic include the
examples of Noem threatening to sue the Cheyenne River Sioux and Oglala Sioux
over their quarantine roadblocks, as well as the request from county sheriffs in New
Mexico for Navajo police to refrain from citing non-members who violated a tribal
curfew on the Navajo reservation in place to curb infections.159
The economy and tax base are two sides of the same coin for a tribe’s
financial self-sufficiency.160 The lack of these revenue streams and the losses caused
by health and safety measures taken during the pandemic have “impaired tribes’
ability to provide essential governmental services such as health care, education and
public safety at a time when the need is highest.”161 This continues a trend that started
generations ago, putting the tribes in a no-win situation that forces them to rely
largely on support from the federal government, which has essentially looked the
other way.
D.

Social justice for tribes means addressing historic and continued
injustices of colonialism.

COVID-19 brought to the surface problems in Indian Country that are
centuries in the making. To ignore the fact that at the same time that the pandemic
has taken hold of the world, the explosion of racial justice movements has prompted
a global reckoning of racial and economic justice would be to ignore the broader
social-political context of the pandemic and the social imperatives to rectify the
injustices.162 The Black Lives Matter movement and other racial justice movements
have ignited collective consciousness about systematic oppression, but for Native
American Indians and tribal governments, the reckoning is not just about race. For
indigenous communities, these movements “also stem from the political status of the
inherent sovereignty of tribal nations and Indigenous peoples.”163

158. These examples were compiled and documented by Professor Fletcher in his recent essay. See
Fletcher, supra note 11, at 38 at n.2 and accompanying text (citing Letter from Tony Mace, Sheriff, Cibola
Cty., to Officer in Charge, Ramah Navajo Police Dep’t (Apr. 10, 2020); Letter from James Maiorano III,
Undersheriff, McKinley Cty., and Douglas Decker, County Att’y, Cty. Of McKinley, to Ramah Navajo
Police Dep’t (Apr. 9, 2020)).
159. See id.
160. See In Pursuit of Tribal Economic Development, supra note 7, at 784–800 (explaining “barriers
and dangers” of a government utilizing economic development of business creation for revenue generation
without also creating tax streams).
161. DOSHI ET AL., supra note 10, at 1.
162. I do not purport to correlate the pandemic and the racial justice protests, though there is some
research to support the notion that “the pandemic’s negative financial consequences have . . . been helping
fuel the protests,” Maneesh Arora, How the Coronavirus Pandemic Helped the Floyd Protests Become
the
Biggest
in
U.S.
History,
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
5,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/08/05/how-coronavirus-pandemic-helped-floydprotests-become-biggest-us-history/.
163. Susan Smith Richardson, Native Americans and the Racial Reckoning (Interview with Randall
Akee), THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY (Oct. 21, 2020), https://publicintegrity.org/insidepublici/newsletters/the-moment/native-americans-and-the-racial-reckoning/.
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Professor Blackhawk addresses the distinction between social justice issues
pertaining to Indian tribes from those focused on race.164 She calls for looking at
“[c]olonialism and the failure of federal Indian law and policy” to “inform our
general principles of public law as extensively as the failures of slavery and Jim
Crow segregation.”165 To that end, Professor Blackhawk argues that “[t]he
recognition of inherent tribal sovereignty and the use of power to mitigate
colonialism and subordination should take its place aside Brown [v. Board of
Education] and the celebration of rights as a vital way to mitigate constitutional
failure and to protect minorities from subordination.”166 At the heart of the discussion
of tribal sovereignty is tribal governments’ focus on their “distinctly unique
relationship to particular places, particular land.”167 A tribe’s connection to its land
affects economic justice because “the resources available for Indigenous peoples
were primarily with land and access to land but also water rights, mineral rights,
access to resources like rivers and ocean fronts that [produced food], forests and
other aspects of the environment.”168 Beyond the nation’s broader reckoning with
racial and social justice, adequately addressing racial, social, and economic justice
within Indian Country means “returning land, returning resources to Indigenous
peoples,” and doing so “in an equitable way and an economically successful way.”169
While there may be overlap in the social justice calls to reckon with the
evils of the legacies of slavery and the legacies of colonialism, the calls for justice in
Indian Country are all about sovereignty.170 “[I]t all comes down to jurisdiction, selfgovernance and having the land base to be sustaining.”171
Tribal economies bear the burden of the history of state encroachment on
tribal land and the complicated legal landscape of state taxation within Indian
Country that chills outside business investment. Those problems are magnified by
the fall-out of the COVID-19 pandemic and are generally symptoms of the
perpetuation of colonialist policies. Moving forward, states have opportunities to
reshape tax policies with respect to Indian Country to promote tribal sovereignty and
build strong economies.
III. MOVING FROM ZERO-SUM TO ECONOMIC PARTNERS.
One prominent scholar stated: “Covid-19 is a once-in-a century pandemic.
But wildfires and natural disasters are not, income inequality is not, housing
insecurity is not. How do we make investments now that these vulnerable

164. Blackhawk, supra note 11, at 1861–62. For social justice movements based or focused on race,
the framework has always been how to obtain civil rights; for Native Americans and tribes, the focus is
“a ‘power movement’ aimed at reclaiming homelands and the political and economic power sufficient to
govern them.” Id. at 1861.
165. Id. at 1861–62.
166. Id. at 1862.
167. Richardson, supra note 163.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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communities not only survive COVID-19, but also thrive in recovery?”172 The
answer to the question—how to ensure Indian Country thrives in the recovery—is to
promote tribal self-governance and tribal sovereignty. There are many dimensions to
tribal sovereignty, an important one being freedom from state infringement.
This article should not be read to diminish the obligations of the federal
government and the federal government’s role in supporting post-COVID-19
recovery in Indian Country. The federal response to the pandemic in Indian Country
reflects the federal government’s historical failures with respect to its trust
obligations.173 For example, emergency funding intended for tribes under the federal
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”) required some
tribal governments to sue the federal government for relief.174 Tribes that did receive
CARES Act funds were required to comply with bureaucratic measures and submit
data on their members and expenditures that states did not.175 Even then, tribes had
to sue to ensure their fair share of the funding.176 The failings of the trust relationship
rest squarely on the federal government. Those failings include the historical
abdication of federal obligation to protect and prevent state encroachment.
In the post-COVID world, there are many ways in which the federal
government can improve its policies towards tribal nations beyond improving and
honoring its trust obligations. One of the ways in which the federal government could
act would be for Congress to affirmatively and definitively preempt state laws,
including taxation, in Indian Country. There have been numerous scholarly calls for
this federal solution over many years.177
Absent federal solutions, or even in conjunction with them, states can also
play a positive and affirmative role in helping tribes recover from the disparate
impact of the pandemic. And contrary to the historic conflicts between states and
tribes, doing so can be approached and achieved in a cooperative and mutually
beneficial way.
This section argues that states can adopt tax policies to help promote
sovereignty. Those policies include requiring government-to-government
consultation, partnering in decision-making, and allowing for primacy of tribal
taxation in Indian Country, with specific solutions to address the Atkinson problem.

172. Fernanda Santos, Life, Death, and Grief in Los Angeles, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Mar. 2, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/03/02/magazine/covid-la-county-hospitals-black-latinoresidents.html?.?mc=aud_dev&adkeywords=auddevgate&gclid=Cj0KCQjwkbuKBhDRARIsAALysV5DjWsjMFOqaJr8Dw5dRFVBbMOn-2v3GC8LbxHRxEnQyfCvIANIFIaAqwrEALw_wcB&gclsrc=aw.ds
(quoting Sonja Diaz, founding Director of Latino Policy & Politics Initiative at UCLA).
173. For the historical background, see discussion supra Part II.A and text accompanying notes 20–
44.
174. The U.S. Supreme Court recently decided a case between the U.S. Department of the Treasury
and six tribes over CARES Act funding eligibility in two consolidated cases. Yellen v. Chehalis
Reservation, 141 S.Ct. 2434 (2021) (holding that Alaska Native regional and village corporations are
“Indian tribes” and thus are eligible to receive monetary relief under the CARES Act).
175. Carroll, supra note 129. To compound the matter, there was a massive data breach that resulted
in the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive data belonging to tribes and their members. Id.
176. See Shawnee Tribe v. Mnuchin, 984 F.3d 94 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
177. See Cowan, supra note 8.
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178

States that adopt these policies will benefit economically in the long term. They
will grow their state and local economies, reduce state obligations to provide social
safety net services and support within Indian Country, and they will heal the wounds
of historic enmity, allowing tribes to flourish in incalculable and intangible ways far
beyond economic development.
A.

States can adopt tax policies to promote tribal sovereignty.

There are two policies states can adopt to help promote tribal sovereignty.
First, states can adopt and follow policies requiring meaningful consultation with
tribes on matters regarding taxation. That process of consultation will lead to joint
decision-making between tribes and states. Second, states can refrain from asserting
taxing authority within Indian Country and allow for tribal tax primacy.
1.

States should engage in meaningful government-to-government
consultation and joint decision-making with tribes.

“Meaningful consultation” refers to governments working as “management
partners,” as opposed to adversaries.179 The policy of the federal government
consulting with tribes prior to the governmental action is an extension of the trust
relationship.180 Though not arising from official trust obligations, many states have
similar consultation requirements with respect to state actions that impact tribes,
encouraging cooperative decision-making and promoting tribal sovereignty.181
a.

The origins of consultation and federal executive policies requiring such
practices

The notion that tribes should be treated as an equal government was
historical practice, evidenced by treaties entered into between various tribes, Britain,
and several colonies.182 The federal government’s trust responsibility with respect to
Indian tribes, once described as “domestic dependent nations,”183 evolved from
paternalistic-type actions into a doctrine that “purports to recognize tribal selfdetermination.”184
Contemporary evidence of government-to-government engagement is
exemplified through the practice of consultation. President Clinton signed Executive
178. These suggestions are not novel, but current circumstances create a tremendous opportunity for
states to shift direction. See Croman & Taylor, supra note 98, at 27–29.
179. Michael C. Blumm & Lizzy Pennock, Tribal Consultation: Toward Meaningful Collaboration
with the Federal Government, 33 COLO. NAT. RES., ENERGY, & ENV’T L. REV. 1 (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 5–6) (on file with author).
180. Id. at 3–4 (“The government-to-government relationship between tribes and the federal
government arise out of the trust doctrine, and government-to-government consultation is a substantial
aspect of the relationship.”).
181. See generally Fletcher, supra note 3, at 81–83.
182. CANBY, supra note 1, at 13.
183. In one of the cases of the Marshall trilogy, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831),
Chief Justice John Marshall compared the relationship between tribes and the federal government as
“ward to his guardian.”
184. See Blumm & Pennock, supra note 179, at 4, for more on the history of the evolution of the trust
doctrine.
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Order 13175 in 2000 (the “Executive Order”), implementing official federal policy
requiring “regular and meaningful consultations and collaboration” between tribes
and the federal government on all “policies that have tribal implications.”185 Six days
after taking office, President Biden issued a Memorandum on Tribal Consultation
and reaffirmed the policy directives contained in the original order by President
Clinton.186 The Executive Order first recognizes Indian tribes as sovereign
governments.187 It then requires all federal agencies to respect Indian tribal selfgovernment and sovereignty; honor treaty and other rights; grant discretion to Indian
tribal governments; and encourage tribes to set their own policies and establish
applicable standards.188 Furthermore, federal agencies must “have an accountable
process to ensure meaningful and timely input by tribal officials.”189 In practice, this
means engaging with the tribes in timely, respectful, and meaningful ways on matters
that affect them.
b.

Existing consultation policies and practices by state governments

The Executive Order only applies to federal agencies. State policies
requiring consultation are neither uniform in existence nor execution. For example,
the state of Washington has an official Tribal Consent and Consultation Policy that
requires the Washington State Office of the Attorney General to share information
as well as identify and address tribal concerns with proposed courses of action that
“directly and tangibly affect Tribes, rights, or tribal lands.”190 Other states also
require their agencies to engage with tribes directly through government-togovernment consultation.191
In practice, despite these statutory or executive mandates for consultation
and government-to-government engagement, some states continue to assert power
over tribal governments without any demonstration of cooperative spirit. For
example, despite Washington state’s requirement that the attorney general consult
with tribes, Washington’s Department of Revenue has engaged in protracted legal

185. Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000). The term “policies that have tribal
implications,” is defined as regulations, legislative comments, or proposed legislation, and other policy
statements or actions that have substantial direct effects on one or more Indian tribes, on the relationship
between the Federal Government and Indian tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities
between the Federal Government and Indian tribes.” Id. § 1(a).
The foundation for the President Clinton’s Consultation Executive Order was created years prior by
President Nixon in an address to Congress in July 1970. President Nixon condemned the policies of
termination. Instead, he articulated his administration’s proposals for the federal government to “build
upon the capacities and insights of the Indian people,” creating an environment for “the federal
government and the Indian community play complementary roles.” Special Message on Indian Affairs,
1970 Pub. Papers 564, 565, 576 (1970).
186. See Memorandum on Tribal Consultation and Strengthening Nation-to-Nation Relationships,
DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Jan. 26, 2021).
187. Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249, § 2.
188. Id. § 3.
189. Id. § 5.
190. WASH. STATE OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN., TRIBAL CONSENT & CONSULTATION POLICY,
CENTENNIAL ACCORD PLAN (May 10, 2019), https://www.atg.wa.gov/print/12902.
191. For citations to a number of states that require agencies to deal with tribes on a “government to
government basis,” see Fletcher, supra note 3, at 83, nn.81–82, and accompanying text.
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battles with tribes over state taxation.192 This litigation includes a case that went to
the United States Supreme Court in 2019 called Washington State Department of
Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc.193 Regardless of what policies exist, such litigation
demonstrates that, in practice, states are not adhering to the spirit of the policies.194
Washington state is not the only state not adhering to the practice of
consultation. In Montana, state law says it is intended “to promote cooperation
between the state or a public agency and a sovereign tribal government in mutually
beneficial activities and services.”195 Even with this stated intent for mutual benefit,
the Montana legislature acted in a manner inconsistent with the stated purpose by
amending the law to allow counties to pursue back taxes on tribally held fee land
outside the reservation despite strong condemnation of such legislation by tribal
leaders.196 As these examples demonstrate, states continue to encroach on tribal
authority without following state declarations of cooperation between the state and
tribes. Consultation requirements must not just exist; they must also be adhered to
and practiced.
c.

State consultation and joint decision-making with tribes recognizes tribal
sovereignty and will lead to cooperative solutions.

As Professor Blackhawk posited, protecting Native peoples has been best
accomplished “by bestowing power, not rights, through the recognition of inherent
tribal sovereignty.”197 This functional acknowledgment of power—by consulting
and engaging with tribes in joint decision-making—must be done by states and local
governments in a consistent and systematic manner.198
There is an expectation that the process of consultation results in the shared
governance and cooperative sovereignty to ensure solutions that work for all parties.
Recognizing and respecting tribal sovereignty goes beyond states merely consulting
with tribes about planned courses of action; it requires partnering with tribes to make

192. See Tulalip Tribes, 349 F. Supp.3d 1046, discussed supra Part II.B.3; notes 91–96 and
accompanying text.
193. 139 S. Ct. 1000 (2019). The issue in Cougar Den was construction of the treaty between the
Yakima Indian Nation and the federal government and the tax involved was a state fuel tax imposed on
wholesalers of fuel sold by a tribal enterprise to tribal members. Id.
194. The author is not aware of any discussions, communications, or attempts on behalf of the state of
Washington to consult with the tribes in either of the cases, Tulalip Tribes or Cougar Den, prior to
Washington asserting taxing authority over the transactions in those cases. The Washington state policy
requiring Tribal Consent & Consultation does not require the Washington Department of Revenue to
consult, however it does specifically state that the Attorney general represents “all officials, departments,
boards, commissions, and agencies in the state,” and “is involved in a wide array of issues which
potentially impact state agencies and tribal governments in their relations with one another.” WASH.
STATE OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN., TRIBAL CONSENT & CONSULTATION POLICY (2019).
195. MONT. CODE ANN. § 18-11-101(2) (West 1993).
196. See S.B. 214, 67th Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2021).
197. Blackhawk, supra note 11, at 1798.
198. See Fletcher, supra note 3, at 87 (“Each time a state or local government agrees to negotiate with
an Indian tribe and then to execute a binding agreement with an Indian tribe, that non-Indian government
is recognizing the legitimacy of the tribal government.”).
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joint decisions.199 Common characteristics in successful tribal economies include
principles of sovereignty.200 Specifically, non-indigenous governments, such as the
state and local governments adjacent to a tribe, can best promote the tribe’s economic
development by serving in a “resource role.”201 As resources, state and local
governments ought to move “from consultation to partnerships,” where the two
sovereigns make joint decisions in areas of overlapping interest.202
d.

Consultation is distinct from compacting.

Compacting and consultation, though they share attributes, are not the same
thing. Consultation represents engagement by a state, local, or federal government
with a tribal government to work with the tribe regarding issues that have
implications for the tribe.203 Compacting is an inter-governmental agreement
between tribes and states that resolves an issue of overlapping, or potentially
overlapping, jurisdiction.204 Compacting necessarily requires engagement between
sovereigns and the recognition of inherent sovereignty between the negotiating
parties.205 Compacting usually requires concessions between the state and tribal
governments as to their rights as sovereigns—since the purpose of compacting has
been to avoid the consequences of each party imposing its own tax.206 Consulting
does not have to lead to such concessions by tribes. As argued below, consultation
and joint decision-making between tribes and states could lead to primacy of tribal
taxation in Indian Country which may improve state and local economies too.207
Compacting has been a useful tool for tribes and states as an extrajudicial
solution to the problems of double taxation while working with the constraints of the
jurisprudence. However, it is not sufficient to ensure full sovereignty for tribes.
Compacting does not ensure that tribes can attract business and raise revenue to pay
for the infrastructure and other costs necessary to attract business investment because
the terms of compacts often vary as to revenue amount and allocation. The district
court in Tulalip Tribes acknowledged this when it listed the tribal interests and found
that the Tribe was still able to build the commercial center, but not “collect the full
measure of its own sales tax from the non-Indian businesses.”208 Backed into a corner
and facing the reality of a zero-sum tax revenue outcome from litigation, the Tulalip
Tribe recently entered into a compact with the state of Washington and Snohomish

199. Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Two Approaches to the Development of Native Nations: One
Works, the Other Doesn’t, in REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS: STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNANCE AND
DEVELOPMENT 3, 27–28 (2007).
200. Id. at 19–22.
201. Id. at 27.
202. Id. at 28.
203. See Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, 65 Fed. Reg. 67249 (Nov.
6, 2000).
204. Note, Intergovernmental Compacts in Native American Law: Models for Expanded Usage, 112
HARV. L. REV. 922, 924 (1999).
205. See Cowan, supra note 8, at 133–34; infra notes 214–215 and accompanying text.
206. See Cowan, supra note 8, at 135; infra notes 216–219 and accompanying text.
207. See infra Parts III.A.2. & B.
208. 349 F. Supp. 3d 1046, 1059 (W.D. Wash. 2018).
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County to mitigate this result.209 Thus, compacting is not sufficient to resolve the
economic needs of tribes brought to light by the pandemic. Consultation and joint
decision-making are necessary to promote tribal sovereignty.
2.

States should promote primacy of tribal taxation in Indian Country.

The next step beyond consultation and joint decision-making is for states to
allow for primacy of tribal taxation in Indian Country.210 If state and local
governments allowed tribal primacy in taxation, all the collateral consequences to
tribal economies that occur when state and local governments tax transactions
occurring within Indian Country would be alleviated. If states and localities deferred
to tribes and refrained from asserting their potential taxing authority, tribes would
not only benefit from their own tax revenues, but they would also retain the ability
to attract outside investment, furthering the tribes’ economic development.211
Recognizing tribes as primary and appropriate sovereigns to exercise taxing
authority over transactions that the state could possibly tax would allow them to grow
their tax bases, increase economic development, and better provide for their
members.212
A common objection to primacy by state and local governments is that
tribes will “market [their] exemption,” as an enticement to draw business to the
reservation.213 First, it is important to note that the framework of deferring to tribes
and offering tribal primacy does create a possibility of a tribe imposing a lower rate
of taxation or imposing no tax at all. Doing so would create the possibility of
economic distortions regarding consumer behavior that make for poor tax policy.214
Tribes need both sides of the economic development coin—they need the tax revenue
generated by the tax base of reservation businesses and investments. Furthermore,
there is the chance that, with government-to-government consultation and
“cooperative sovereignty,” tribes and states can arrive at neutral, non-distortive tax
policies that avoid a “race for the bottom.”215
Finally, this argument has veiled racist arguments used by a dominant
culture to justify or moralize the legacy of injustices against historically marginalized

209. Retail Taxes Compacts, WASH. ST. DEP’T OF REVENUE, https://dor.wa.gov/taxes-rates/retailsales-tax/retail-taxes-compacts; Jerry Cornfield, Deal Ends Legal Fight and Allows Tulalips a Cut of Sales
Tax, HERALDNET, EVERETT, WASH. (Jan. 29, 2020, 9:13 PM), https://www.heraldnet.com/news/dealends-legal-fight-and-allows-tulalips-a-cut-of-sales-tax/.
210. These suggestions are not novel, but current circumstances create a tremendous opportunity for
states to shift direction. See Croman & Taylor, supra note 98, at 27–29.
211. The economic studies also support the position that when states cede taxing authority, there is the
collateral benefit of reducing conflict between tribes and states. Id. at 28–29.
212. Id. at 14.
213. Fletcher, supra note 7, at 804 (noting that this objection ignores the reality that this problem exists
in multistate taxation and argues that tribes should be able to do so if necessary).
With globalization of economies and businesses, there is a movement away from allowing countries to
market the exemption in the international tax arena. See Alan Rappeport, Finance Leaders Reach Global
Tax
Deal
Aimed
at
Ending
Profit
Shifting,
N.Y. TIMES
(June
5,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/05/us/politics/g7-global-minimum-tax.html (discussing an agreement
among the “Group of [Seven]” nations to back global minimum tax).
214. See Barsh, supra note 3, at 544; Part II.B.3, supra notes 97–109 and accompanying text.
215. See McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2481 (2020).
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peoples.216 Allowing for primacy of tribal tax would resolve any such implications
in favor of deferring to tribal sovereignty and self-determination.
3.

State and local governments will need to adopt specific policies to
address the Atkinson problem.

The Atkinson problem—a tribe lacking taxing authority over a non-Indian
business located on land owned by non-Indians within a reservation—cannot be
addressed by giving a tribe primacy of taxation because the tribe has been stripped
of that authority as a legal matter. The solution to such a problem has similar
attributes as the solution to the problems where there is overlapping, or at least
potentially overlapping, jurisdiction to impose tax.
Instead of deferring to tribes to create a policy, the Atkinson problem
requires states to consult with tribes and work with the tribe to impose a similar state
or local tax as the tribe imposes. This correction will ensure a tax neutral result and
minimizes distortions that result from the checkerboard pattern of ownership
resulting from Allotment-era policies. This policy solution has support from the
recent opinion in McGirt v. Oklahoma.217 In McGirt, the Court held in favor of
territorial sovereignty as opposed to focusing on the status of land ownership within
the Tribe’s reservation.218
B.

States and local governments will face obstacles in implementing the
suggested policies.

It would be naïve to believe that state and local governments will be eager
to adopt these policies. Certainly, many states and local governments will be
reluctant to consult, make joint decisions, or cede authority to neighboring tribal
governments. States and local governments may fear losing precious state and local
revenue streams and lack of political will.
Data gathered early in the COVID-19 pandemic indicated decreases in state
and local government revenue.219 The American Rescue Plan, however, provides
immediate relief in the short term for state and local governments. And such relief
can create flexibility and freedom for state and local governments to think about the
long-term economic interests of their governments and citizens.
Political will, on the other hand, is a more challenging problem to
overcome. Voters may be skeptical of deference to tribes. Certainly, historically,
some voters in states that compact have viewed revenue sharing as unfavorable.220
An initial shift from policies of competition with tribes toward principles of “comity

216. See Fletcher, supra note 7 at 785–87; supra note 185 and accompanying text.
217. 140 S. Ct. 2452.
218. Id. at 2481. The opinion in McGirt does not change the rule articulated in Atkinson; rather the
focus and outcome may signal a shift from modern jurisprudence back to territorial jurisdiction. See Dylan
R. Hedden-Nicely & Stacy L. Leeds, A Familiar Crossroads: McGirt v. Oklahoma and the Future of the
Federal Indian Law Canon, 51 N.M. L. REV. 300 (2021).
219. Alan Auerbach, Bill Gale, Bryon Lutz & Louise Sheiner, Fiscal Effects of COVID-19,
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Sept. 24, 2020, at 1, 22–25.
220. Cowan, supra note 8, at 135.
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and cooperative sovereignty,” may require diplomacy and finesse.221 But, just as the
Supreme Court was more receptive to reconsidering territorial sovereignty in
McGirt, non-Indians living in proximity to tribes may also come around to
reconsidering it if economic conditions improve for everyone.222 In McGirt, the
Supreme Court inferred that states and tribes ought to be considering working as
partners.223 Perhaps if the Supreme Court can reverse course, the political will can
too.
Finally, critics may quickly ask about the type of enforcement there is for
state and local governments who do not engage in these type of collaborative
sovereignty policies. This article does not contain policy prescriptions that should be
authoritatively adopted. As Professor Blackhawk noted, the access to the legislative
and executive branches have been where Indian law has seen most success.224 The
“ability to access the lawmaking process” in an extra-judicial manner, has “provided
sanctuary” for tribal governments.225 Here too, the prescriptions should be seen to
inform law and policy makers to look to the longer-term horizon.
C.

Reasons why states and local governments ought to adopt these policies.

Far from an all-or-nothing proposition, states will not sacrifice their
potential tax revenues in vain. Economic studies show that growth on reservations
benefits state economies in two ways.
1.

Tribal economic growth correlates to overall economic growth
within the states and local areas.

Data from researchers in the field of economic development specific to
Indian Country show that, when tribal economies grow, state and local economies
have corresponding growth. Data shows that reservation economies contribute to
“broader regional and national economies.”226 Both tribal governments and
reservation businesses spend significant money off reservations.227 A study in 1998,
reported that tribes spend $1.2 billion and reservation businesses spend $4.4 billion
off-reservation.228 The spending by tribes, reservation businesses, and tribal residents
created $246 million in state and local tax revenue and $4.1 billion in federal tax
revenue on an annual basis.229
Data analyzing regional economic impact of tribal economic development
indicates that tribes such as the Mississippi Choctaw, Citizen Potawatomi, and
Winnebago of Nebraska are “dominant economic forces in otherwise relatively poor
221. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2481.
222. If economic conditions improve for both tribes and their members and the non-Indian community
adjacent to tribal nations, the quote by James Carville comes to mind: “It’s the economy, stupid.” It’s the
Economy, Stupid, POL. DICTIONARY, https://politicaldictionary.com/words/its-the-economy-stupid/.
223. 140 S. Ct. at 2481 (“[I]t is unclear why pessimism should rule the day.”).
224. Blackhawk, supra note 11, at 1799.
225. Id.
226. See HARVARD PROJECT ON AM. INDIAN ECON. DEV., THE STATE OF THE NATIVE NATIONS:
CONDITIONS UNDER U.S. POLICIES OF SELF-DETERMINATION, 118 (Oxford Univ. Press 2008).
227. See id.
228. Id. at 118 & 140 n.12 and accompanying text.
229. Id. at 118.
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and rural settings.”230 One reason for the economic impact on the entire region where
the tribes are located geographically is that the tribes often employ “large numbers
of non-Indians,” along with the tribe’s own citizens.231
Other data from the state of Washington corroborates the finding that tribal
economic growth correlates to growth in the broader local and state economies. A
report on the twenty-seven tribes located within Washington state from 1997,
showed contribution of $1 billion to the economy.232 This $1 billion was made up by
tribal enterprises that purchased $865.8 million in goods and services, tribes that paid
$51.3 million in federal employment and payroll taxes, and $5.3 million in state
employment and payroll taxes on employment of over 14,000 individuals, many of
whom were non-Indian.233
Even if state and local governments adopt these policies and refrain from
imposing, or attempting to impose, taxation within Indian Country, thriving
businesses in Indian Country will not develop overnight. Recent scholarship explains
how tribes can look to “historical and traditional customs, laws, values, behaviors,
structures, and mechanisms for engaging in economic activities.”234 State taxation is
but one hinderance in that overall pursuit.235
2.

Improved tribal economic conditions reduce tribal poverty which
lessens the burden on state social services.

Data regarding the economic status of individuals residing on reservations
“highlight[s] the crucial need” of tribal governments to create sustainable economies
sufficient to pull their members out of poverty.236 In Tulalip Tribe v. Washington,
the federal district court entertained testimony at trial regarding state and local
government allocations of revenue that went to pay for education, social services,
and other general services that were available to members of the Tulalip Tribe.237 In
doing so, the court realized that it was impossible to quantify and weigh the “relative
value of what are patently unquantifiable services provided by [the Tribe, state, and
county].”238 As tribes are better positioned economically to provide for its citizens,
state and local governments will be relieved of whatever portion of the burden of
social services they carry. Known as the “multiplier effect,” as tribal economies

230. Id. at 119.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 119–20 & 140 n.13 and accompanying text.
234. Robert J. Miller, Sovereign Resilience: Reviving Private-Sector Economic Institutions in Indian
Country, 2018 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1331, 1334 (2018).
235. Crepelle, supra note 7, at 1000 (“Several factors contribute to Indian country’s economic despair,
but state taxation of Indian country commerce is the most severe impediment.”).
236. Miller, supra note 233, at 1335. For a thorough explanation of current economic conditions in
Indian Country, including data on unemployment, lack of educational opportunities, housing, basic
infrastructure, and overall poverty levels, see supra note 233, at 1335–38. But cf. Carroll et.al, supra note
129, for critical commentary on data erasure of indigenous peoples.
237. 349 F.Supp.3d 1046, 1060–62 (W.D. Wash. 2018).
238. Id. at 1061–62.
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develop and flourish in both public and private sectors, conditions will improve
within Indian Country.239
3.

Process of healing wounds of historic enmity

Beyond improving state and local economies, or easing the burden of state
social services, adopting these policies can help heal the wounds of historic enmity
and the recent shared tragedy of COVID-19. The value of healing wounds cannot be
quantified or measured in dollars, but that does not make it any less real.
A tribe’s ability to self-govern is the foundation for sustainable economic
development.240 But self-governance, self-determination, and sovereignty create
conditions in which tribes can develop so much more than economic development.
With increased ability to self-govern, tribes and their peoples will see improvements
in health outcomes, cultural and spiritual engagement, educational opportunities, and
a broad range of social-economic indicators.
State and local governments can help promote tribal sovereignty by
engaging in meaningful consultation, joint decision-making, and by allowing for
tribal tax primacy. Doing so will create economic benefits for tribes and states alike
and it will also have non-economic benefits for tribes.
IV. CONCLUSION
If the study of Indian law teaches one broad principle, it is that no current
situation in Indian Country occurs in a vacuum.241 The reaches of state taxation, and
limits on a tribe’s taxation authority, are shaped not only by history, but also by the
COVID-19 pandemic.
Professor Fletcher argued for “[r]etiring the deadliest enemies model;”242
Professor Blackhawk provided a framework for doing so; and even the Supreme
Court is encouraging tribal-state cooperative sovereignty.243 State and local
governments should adopt tax policies that ensure consultation and joint decisionmaking with tribal governments. State and local governments should allow for
primacy of tribal taxation within tribal territories, promoting territorial sovereignty.
Long-term economic benefits to both tribes and states will outweigh any short-term
revenue losses to state and local governments. Instead of competing for a zero-sum
taxing authority, tribes and states can become partners to ensure economic protection
against future pandemics and to resolve the historic trauma of colonialism.

239. Miller, supra note 233 (citing to economic literature on the “multiplier effect.”). This type of
economic growth will “keep [] money circulating and re-circulating in Indian country creat[ing] more
businesses, more jobs, more income, and better conditions for everyone.” Miller, supra note 233.
240. HARVARD PROJECT ON AM. INDIAN ECON. DEV., supra note 225, at 121 (“Comparative research
across a spectrum of tribal contexts has found that successful economic development is most likely to
occur when tribes effectively assert their sovereignty and back up such assertions with capable and
culturally appropriate institutions of self-government.”).
241. See Cohen supra note 1, at 5 (“Indian law and history are the opposite sides of the same coin.”).
242. Fletcher, supra note 3.
243. McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S.Ct. 2452, 2481 (2020).

